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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,' the United States
Supreme Court established that a mother's right to privacy extends
to her decision to terminate her pregnancy. In reaching its decision,
the Court expressly refused to discuss "the father's rights, if any
exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision.''2 In the
past, however, the Court has recognized that fathers have important
constitutional rights concerning procreation,3 privacy, 4 and parent-
hood.' There is an apparent conflict between these earlier Supreme
Court decisions and the refusal by the Roe Court to discuss the
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 165 n.67.
3. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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father's rights in the abortion decision. The Court should address
this issue because it is an on-going controversy.6
The scope of this article concerns a father's 7 notification and
prohibition8 rights in the decision of the mother to abort their child.
In order to assess the extent of these rights, the author will analyze
the following: 1) The constitutional rights of the mother and father
recognized before Roe; 2) the landmark case of Roe v. Wade;9 3)
how courts have decided the issues in the past; 4) the new approach
fathers are taking today to challenge an abortion; 5) a prediction
of how the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would ap-
proach a father's right to be notified of or to prohibit the decision
to abort a fetus he fathered; and 6) the possible effect the present
makeup of the United States Supreme Court might have upon these
issues.
II. Tim CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INVOLVED
A. Decisions Prior to Roe v. Wade
Long before Roe v. Wade,'0 the United States Supreme Court
began to recognize that individuals have privacy rights as well as
certain other privacy-related interests. For example, in the nineteenth
century the Supreme Court declared that the fourth" and fifth' 2
amendments of the Constitution protected "the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life"' 3 from governmental intrusion. Later,
6. For example, some members of the National Right to Life Committee (pro-life) and the
American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Freedom Project (pro-choice) say that such cases as-
serting fathers' rights are likely to be a .'new battleground on abortion rights."' See N.Y. Times,
April 14, 1988, § A at 26, col. 1.
7. The author assumes that the spouse is the father of the unborn child, although the reader
should be aware that this may not always be the view of a particular legislature.
8. The author uses the words "consent," "veto," and "prohibition" interchangeably. The
right to consent is, in effect, the right to veto or to prohibit the abortion.
9. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
10. Id.
11. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ... U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
12. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONSr. amend.
V.
13. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
[Vol. 91
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in the early twentieth century, the Court recognized that the rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment 4 included the right "to
marry, establish a home and bring up children . "..." ' These hold-
ings were the forerunners of the "right to privacy" which the Court
expressly recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.
16
In 1965, the Griswold Court struck down a state statute that
prohibited the use and distribution of information concerning con-
traceptives. 7 In doing so, the Court recognized for the first time
the existence of certain fundamental "liberties" or "zones" of pri-
vacy that are derived from the total scope of rights expressed in the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. 8 The Court held that,
although the right to privacy is not specifically set forth in the Con-
stitution, its existence is necessary to make the express guarantees
therein meaningful. 9
The Griswold Court found that the zones of privacy are included
in the following: the right to association ensured by the first amend-
ment;20 the third amendment prohibition of the quartering of soldiers
"in any house" in time of peace without the owner's consent; the
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures; 2' the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause; and the
ninth amendment22 provision that "[t]he enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people." 23
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
15. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
16. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32 (Rev. 1958) (providing that any person who uses any drug or
other instrument for the purposes of preventing conception shall be fined or imprisoned).
18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
19. Id. at 483.
20. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963)).
21. Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (ninth amendment supports the view
that the "liberty" protected by fifth and fourteenth amendments is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments).
23. Id. at 484.
19881
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After Griswold, the Supreme Court again recognized an indi-
vidual's privacy interests in Eisenstadt v. Baird.24 There the Court
invalidated a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the distribution
of any contraceptive drug or device to unmarried persons as a vi-
olation of the equal protection clause. The Court's reasoning em-
phasized the freedom of an individual to decide whether to bear or
beget a child:
[The marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."
The Court also has recognized the right of an individual to marry
a member of another race. In Loving v. Virginia,26 a Virginia statute
restricted the freedom of whites to marry members of other races.
Relying on the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court held that
this right resided with the individual and could not be infringed upon
by the state; therefore, the statute was unconstitutional. 27
In addition to the pre-Roe decisions mentioned above, which
recognized the rights of individuals, the Supreme Court has decided
other cases which recognize the rights of a father specifically. For
example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,28 the Court recognized a man's
right to procreate. There, a statute which authorized the sterilization
of habitual criminals was held to be a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause. 29 Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the Court,
emphasized that the statute deprived an individual of a right which
is basic to the perpetuation of a race, the right to have offspring. 0
24. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
25. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
26. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. Id. at 12.
28. Skinner, 316 U.S. 535.
29. Id. at 541. The Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection
of the law to certain habitual criminals by providing for their sterilization but not for that of other
criminals who committed the same quality of offense.
30. Id. at 536.
[Vol. 91
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The Court reasoned that "marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race.''31
Another father's .right, the right to parenthood, was specifically
recognized by the Court in Stanley v. Illinois.32 The Court invali-
dated an Illinois statute under which the children of unwed fathers
automatically became wards of the state upon the death of the
mother. There, the Court acknowledged "[the] interest of a parent
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children. . .. "I'
The Supreme Court, up to this point in time, had acknowledged
privacy rights of both men and women. However, the Court had
not yet decided if a woman's right to privacy extended to the de-
cision to terminate her pregnancy. Nevertheless, lower federal and
state courts were addressing the abortion issue. Some courts ex-
tended the "zones" of privacy recognized in Griswold to include
the right of a mother, in her early stages of pregnancy, to decide
whether to bear the child.3 4 In Babbitz v. McCann,35 a Wisconsin
District Court held that the ninth amendment 36 protected this right.
The court invalidated the abortion statute, which only legalized the
procedure when "necessary . . . to save the life of the mother. '37
It declared the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that recent
Supreme Court decisions38 concerning the ninth amendment could
not allow a state to deprive a woman of her private decision of
whether to bear her "unquickened child." 39
In United States v. Vuitch,4° the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia invalidated an abortion statute which pro-
31. Id. at 541.
32. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
33. Id. at 651.
34. See, e.g., Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400
U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
35. Babbitz, 310 F. Supp. 293.
36. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CON T. amend. IX.
37. Babbitz, 310 F. Supp. at 297-98. (The court did not invalidate the statute on grounds of
vagueness, rather it invalidated it as violative of the ninth amendment).
38. Id. at 299-300 (citing Supreme Court decisions such as Meyer, 262 U.S. 390, Skinner, 316
U.S. 535, & Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
39. Babbitz, 310 F. Sup~p. at 299.
40. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032.
1988]
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hibited abortion unless performed "for the preservation of the moth-
er's life or health."14' The court held the statute unconstitutional for
vagueness and for undue infringement upon the mother's right to
privacy. The district judge noted that previous Supreme Court de-
cisions indicated that a mother's right to privacy extended to family,
marriage, and sex matters and may include the right to terminate
an unwanted child, at least in the early stages of pregnancy.4 2 Al-
though the vagueness issue was reversed on appeal, 4 the United
States Supreme Court later noted that it did interpret the statute as
one which favored abortion in specific circumstances."
The lower courts had begun to expand the mother's privacy rights
without addressing the privacy rights of the father. 45 However, the
United States Supreme Court had not yet decided whether privacy
rights were involved in the abortion decision and, if so, whose rights
were involved-those of the mother or those of the mother and the
father.
B. Roe v. Wade
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Roe v. Wade.46 An unmarried pregnant woman brought a
class action challenging the constitutionality of Texas criminal abor-
tion statutes.47 The woman claimed that the Texas statutes were un-
41. "Whoever. . .produces . . . an abortion . . .on any woman, unless the same were done
as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health and under the direction of a competent
licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned. . . ." D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-201 (1973).
42. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1035.
43. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 70 (discussion of Congressional judgment that women should be able
to obtain abortions needed for the preservation of their lives or health).
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-59 (discussion that the word "person," as used in the fourteenth
amendment, does not include the "unborn"). The Court stated, "Indeed, our decision in United
States v. Vuitch . . . inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in
statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence
was the termination of life entitled to fourteenth amendment protection." Id. (citations omitted).
45. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
46. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
47. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 1191-94, 1196 (Vernon 1961). These statutes provided in part:
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to
be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence
or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he
shall be confined in the penitentiary. . . .By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus
or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be
caused.
Id. at art. 1191.
[Vol. 91
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constitutionally vague and that they infringed upon her right of
personal privacy, as protected by the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments. 48 Counsel for the state argued that life be-
gins at conception and that the state, therefore, had a compelling
interest in protecting life from and after conception. 49 The district
court held that the right to choose whether to have children was
protected by the ninth amendment and that the statutes were un-
constitutionally vague. 0 However, that court refused the grant of
an injunction against their continued enforcement.5
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the lower court 2 by a seven to two 53 majority. Justice
Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Based upon an anal-
ysis of the right to privacy, the Court held that a mother's privacy
right is broad enough to encompass her decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.5 4 Here, as in Griswold, the Court recog-
nized that the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of
privacy; however, a guarantee of certain zones of privacy does exist.
55
The Court found that the roots of these zones of privacy are in the
first amendment 5 6 in the fourth and fifth amendments 57 in the pe-
numbra of the Bill of Rights, 8 and in the concept of liberty guar-
anteed by the first section of the fourteenth amendment .59 However,
"only personal rights, those that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit' in the concept of liberty,'' 6° are included in this guarantee
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
49. Id. at 159.
50. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (N.D. Tex 1970).
51. Id. (abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction).
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 114. (The mother appealed the denial of injunctive relief, and the Supreme
Court granted the appeal because the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief were
necessarily identical.).
53. Id. (Justice White and Justice Rehnquist dissented).
54. Id. at 152.
55. Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483).
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
57. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
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of personal privacy. The Court further noted that past decisions
make it clear that the right has some application to activities related
to marriage, 61 procreation,6 2 contraception, 6 family relationships, 64
and child rearing.
6
The Court also emphasized the specific and direct harm that the
state would impose upon women if it denied the abortion decision
altogether. For example, maternity could force upon the mother a
distressful life and future, the problems of bringing a child into a
family already unable to care for it, or the stigma of unwed moth-
erhood.66
However, the Court also recognized that state regulation is ap-
propriate in some instances. A state may assert the important in-
terests of safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and
protecting potential life. 67 The Court refused to resolve the question
of when life begins, 6 but noted that a "person" as used in the
fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn. 69 Nevertheless,
these state interests, at some point in the pregnancy, become com-
pelling. 70 As a result, the privacy right involved is not absolute. 7
The Court established the "trimester" system to balance the
mother's privacy rights against these state interests. 2 That is, prior
to the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not
interfere with or regulate the decision made by the mother and her
physician that the pregnancy should be terminated. During the sec-
ond trimester, the time from and after the first trimester until the
61. Id. (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
62. Id. (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42).
63. Id. (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54).
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
65. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
66. Id. at 152.
67. Id. at 154.
68. The Court stated, "When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy,
and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Id. at 159.
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
70. Id. at 155. Regulation may only be justified by a compelling state interest where fundamental
rights are involved).
71. Id. at 154.
72. Id. at 163-64.
[Vol. 91
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fetus becomes viable,73 the state may regulate the abortion procedure
only to the extent that such regulation relates to the preservation
and protection of human health. From and after viability (the third
trimester), the state may prohibit abortions altogether except those
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
74
Thus, the "compelling point," in light of medical knowledge at
the time of the Court's decision, was determined to be approximately
the end of the first trimester. 75 At this point, the Court acknowl-
edged the legality of state regulation of the abortion procedure which
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health. 76 At the end of the second trimester, the Court acknowledged
regulation with respect to the state's interest in potential life. 77 This
point is important because the fetus then has the presumed potential
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. 78
The Texas statutes made no distinction between abortions per-
formed early in the pregnancy and those performed later. They fur-
ther limited abortion to instances where the procedure was necessary
to save the mother's life. 79 The Roe Court found that the statute
was unconstitutional on the grounds that it was unduly prohibitive
and unreasonably interfered with the mother's right to decide whether
to abort or carry the child to term. 80
73. The Court defined viability as when the fetus is presumed to have the capability of mean-
ingful life outside the mother's womb, which occurs approximately at the end of the second trimester.
"Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24
weeks." Id. at 160.
74. Note that the Court does not say "abortion decision" during the second trimester. However,
during the third trimester, the Court held that the state may prohibit abortions altogether, thereby
affecting the abortion decision. Roe, 410 U.S. at 114. Perhaps this leaves room for the father to
assert his constitutional rights during the third trimester.
75. Id. at 163.
76. Id. (e.g., requirements as to the qualifications of person who performs the abortion; as to
the licensure of that person; as to the facility where the abortion is to be performed; and, as to the
licensure of that facility).
77. Id. at 163-64. The Court stated that "If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id.
78. Id. at 163; See also Reidinger, Will Roe v. Wade Be Overruled?, 74 A.B.A. J. 68-69 (1988)
(discussing that the point of viability is not moving backward).
79. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
80. Id. at 166.
1988]
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Roe v. Wade stands today as law, holding that a mother's privacy
rights encompass her decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. However, Skinner v. Oklahoma,8s Stanley v. Illinois,82 and
Griswold v. Connecticut 3 also stand today as .law, holding that a
man has constitutionally protected rights in the areas of procreation,
parenthood, and privacy. The Roe decision appears to conflict with
these earlier father's rights recognized by the Court. How did the
Court address this conflict? It stated in a footnote of the Roe opin-
ion that:
[n]either in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton . . . do we discuss the father's
rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No
paternal right has been asserted in either of the cases, and the Texas and the
Georgia statutes on their face take no cognizance of the father. We are aware
that some statutes recognize the father under certain circumstances . . . . [W]e
need not now decide whether provisions of this kind are constitutional.4
Although the Roe Court chose not to discuss this issue, the father's
rights have now become, fifteen years later, the next question in the
abortion debate.
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW AFTER Roe v. Wade
A. Danforth and Other Holdings: The Father's Right to
Consent/Veto
Constitutional challenges to abortion statutes which required the
prior written consent of the spouse were frequent after Roe v. Wade.8"
However, since that decision, the Supreme Court has spoken only
once on a father's rights, in the case of Planned Parenthood of
81. Skinner, 316 U.S. 535.
82. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
83. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
84. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67 (citations omitted).
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Planned Parenthood
Association v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'd sub
nom., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), aff'd, 417 U.S. 281 (1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d
787 (1975); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Jones
v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974), superseded
by statute, FLA. STAT. Am. § 458.22(3)(1) (West 1972).
[Vol. 91
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Central Missouri v. Danforth.86 Although Danforth involved other
issues, its importance with regard to a father's rights involved a
constitutional attack on a Missouri statute. This statute required the
prior written consent of the spouse of the woman seeking an abor-
tion.8 7 The appellees 88 contended that marriage is an institution (im-
plying that the participants in the marriage are co-equals) and that
any changes in the family status must be made jointly.89 They also
argued that the legislature had enacted the provision for the bet-
terment of the state as a whole.90 The appellants9' argued that the
statute effectively afforded the spouse a unilateral right to prevent
or veto the decision to abort.
92
The Court agreed that "[t]he State cannot delegate to a spouse
a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited
from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy. ' 93 It went
on to recognize that the mother, too, acts unilaterally when she,
with the approval of her physician, decides to terminate her preg-
nancy.9 4 However, the Court reasoned thus:
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision,
the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it
is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the [one] more directly
and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs
in her favor.9'
86. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
87. The statute provided in part that "No abortion shall be performed prior to the end
of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy except: . . . (3) With the written consent of the
woman's spouse, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in
order to preserve the life of the mother." Act of June 14, 1974, 1974 Mo. Laws 809 (codified
as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.010-.085 (Vernon 1983)).
88. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 57. Appellees were the Attorney General of Missouri and the Circuit
Attorney of the city of St. Louis.
89. Id. at 67-68.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 56-57. Appellants were Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, a not-for-profit
corporation which performs abortions, and two licensed physicians who also performed abortions.
92. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 68-69 (appellants emphasized that the spouse may or may not have
been the father of the unborn child).
93. "Clearly, since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when
the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular
person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period." Id. at 69.
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Thus, the Court declared the consent provision unconstitutional.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, dissented, stating that:
[a] father's interest in having a child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched
by any other interest in his life. [It] is truly surprising that the majority finds in
the [Constitution] a rule that the State must assign a greater value to a mother's
decision to cut off a potential human life by abortion than to a father's decision
to let it mature into a live child. Such a rule cannot be found there, nor can it
be found in Roe v. Wade.-*
In a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun addressed
the arguments of the dissent:
The dissenting opinion of our Brother White appears to overlook the implications
of this statement upon the issue whether § 3(3) is constitutional. This section does
much more than insure that the husband participate . . . . [Tlhe State instead
has determined that the husband's interest in continuing the pregnancy of his wife
always outweighs any interest on her part . . . [The] State, accordingly, has
granted him the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever reason, the ef-
fectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her Pregnancy.
This State determination not only may discourage the consultation that might
normally be expected to precede a major decision affecting the marital couple,
but also, and more importantly, the State has interposed an absolute obstacle to
a woman's decision that Roe held to be constitutionally protected from such
interference.-
One argument recently made with reference to these two passages
was that the dissent condemned the majority for stating a "per se"
rule that the mother's rights in the abortion decision always outweigh
those of the father.98 However, the majority denied any "per se"
finding and replied that it was this particular statute which was
unconstitutional because it gave a unilateral power of veto to the
spouse in all instances. 99 Therefore, the majority left open other
possibilities for finding rights of the father, such as determination
on a case-by-case basis.
96. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 70 n.11.
98. Telephone interview with Roger Bennett, counsel for the father in Conn v. Conn, 525
N.E.2d 612 (Ind. App. 1988), aff'd, 526 N.E.2d 958 (1988), cert denied, - U.S. - (1988) (July
14, 1988). See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
99. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
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After Danforth, a number of lower courts invalidated statutorily
imposed consent provisions.' °° In Wynn v. Scott,101 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois struck down an
Illinois statute which contained a spousal consent provision, 0 2 rea-
soning that if the abortion regulation was identical or similar to a
provision before the Supreme Court in one of its abortion cases,
then the holding of the Court would be directly applicable and fur-
ther analysis would be unnecessary. 103 This decision illustrates the
approach taken by many courts that rule in accord with Roe and
Danforth, find that a mother has this right, and refuse to address
the rights of the father.' ° However, in light of recent cases in the
lower courts where fathers are asserting their rights, it appears that
some court must eventually address the father's rights in the abortion
decision.
B. The Right To Be Notified
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether a state may compel a mother to notify the father of a
decision to have an abortion, the Court addressed a similar issue
100. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp.
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed sub nom., Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d
193 (1979); Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535 (D.S.C. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 445 (1979); Simopoulos
v. Virginia, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
101. Wynn, 449 F. Supp. 1302.
102. The statute provided in part: "(3) With the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless
the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life or health
of the mother." ILL. A.'N. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-23(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
103. Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1307 (If the provision is not significantly similar to one passed on
by the Supreme Court, the court will analyze and apply relevant constitutional principles. Regulations
which interfere with a mother's right to privacy must be narrowly drawn to meet legitimate state
interests.).
104. Wolfe, 541 F.2d at 525; Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1973);
Floyd, 440 F. Supp. at 539-40; Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. at 537; Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 565-
66; Rampton, 366 F. Supp. at 198, 202 (Anderson, J., concurring in part); Conn., 525 N.E.2d 612
(Ind. App. 1988), aff'd 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988); Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 761,
471 A.2d 1115, 1119 (1984) (court reasoned that woman's privacy rights had been flatly stated and
that father's right to defend his unborn child had not), cert. denied, 298 Md. 353, 469 A.2d 1294
(1984); Simopoulos, 221 Va. at 1076 n.8, 277 S.E.2d at 204 n.8; Rothenberger v. Doe, 149 N.J.
Super. at 481, 374 A.2d at 59 (1977); Jones, 278 So. 2d at 344; cf. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128,
130 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1974) (distinguishing Skinner, Griswold, and Loving as shields for the private
citizen against government action and "not a sword of government assistance to enable him to overturn
the private decisions of his fellow citizens").
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in H. L. v. Matheson.t05 Matheson involved a statute which required
that a minor notify her parents of a pending abortion. In such a
case, where the minor is immature or incompetent, the Court de-
clared that the notification requirement is constitutionally valid. 0 6
The Court found that the notification requirement served a signif-
icant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to supply
essential medical and psychological information to a physician. 07 Its
reasoning appears to be in accord with the general idea that parents
should have the right to protect minor children.
Constitutional challenges to abortion statutes requiring spousal
notification have been common in state courts, and, like challenges
to statutes requiring spousal consent, most have been successful. 08
To succeed, the plaintiff must prove that the statute unjustifiably
burdens or directly interferes with the pregnancy termination de-
cision. 1' 9 If the challenger establishes that it is a "'direct interference'
with the abortion decision or imposes restrictions that did not al-
ready exist,"" 0 the state must then prove that the statute is justified
by a compelling state interest."' To determine if a state interest is
compelling, the court considers both the legitimacy of the interest
and the existence of a rational relationship between the interest in-
volved and the means chosen to advance it.112
The most common state interests that are offered to justify spou-
sal notification statutes include the following: the promotion of mar-
ital harmony;" 3 "the father's interest in the procreative potential of
105. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
106. Id. at 409-10.
107. Id.
108. Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984), stay granted by Eubanks v. Collins,
1987 WL 18511 (W.D. Ky. June 9, 1987); Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979),
aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981) (If the abortion would
present more than a de minimus risk to mothers' abilities to procreate, the spousal notification statute
is not unconstitutional.), on remand, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (statute unconstitutional
since abortion poses less than a de minimus risk to procreative abilities of the mother); Doe v.
Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682 (D. Montana 1976).
109. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55.
110. Scheinberg, 659 F.2d at 482 (quoting Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1980)).
111. Scheinberg, 659 F.2d at 482.
112. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
113. Scheinberg, 482 F. Supp. at 539.
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the marriage;"11 4 and protection of the father's interest in the po-
tential life of the fetus." 5 Although states have asserted these in-
terests, the courts have generally declined to find any of them
compelling. For example, the promotion of marital harmony has
not been a sufficiently compelling state interest. On the contrary,
some courts believe the notification requirement may even promote
marital disharmony.1 6 Similarly, the father's interest in the procre-
ative potential of the marriage has not withstood challenge either.
Courts have reasoned that abortion has only a temporary effect on
the mother's ability to bear children."
17
For example, in Scheinberg v. Smith"' a woman challenged the
constitutionality of a Florida statute which required that she furnish
her husband with notice of her pending abortion to give him the
opportunity to consult with her concerning the procedure." 9 The
state enunciated two compelling state interests in support of the
statute: 1) promotion of the marital relationship and 2) "the hus-
band's interest in the procreative potential of the marriage."' 20 Wit-
nesses testified in support of the woman's challenge that compulsory
spousal notification would produce anxiety and stress for the woman
and the marital relationship.12' Specifically, the expert testimony out-
114. Id.
115. Scheinberg, 659 F.2d at 476 (Court of Appeals raised as an issue the interest of the potential
life of the fetus).
116. See, e.g., Eubanks, 604 F. Supp. at 148:
Marital happiness arises from within the marriage relationship and not by virtue of actions
required by the state. The state should not be in the position of forcing a wife to tell her
husband, in many situations, where the two are not living together, or where, even if living
together, there has been physical abuse or emotional disharmony, about her vitally important
decision.
117. See, e.g., Scheinberg, 550 F. Supp. at 1114 (abortion procedure found not to pose greater
than de minimus risk to a future ability to bear children, so it was unconstitutional).
118. Scheinberg, 482 F. Supp. 529.
119. The Florida Statute provided in part:
If the woman is married, the husband shall be given notice of the proposed termination
of pregnancy and an opportunity to consult with the wife concerning the procedure. . ..
If the husband and wife are separated or estranged, the provisions of this paragraph for
notice or consent shall not be required.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(b) (West 1979) (previously codified as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.505(4)(b)
(Vest 1979)).
120. Scheinberg, 482 F. Supp. at 538-39.
121. Id. at 538.
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lined the following situations where a woman considering an abor-
tion might be unduly burdened by such a requirement: 1) where the
husband is not the father of the unborn child; 2) where the mother
has been a rape victim and has not disclosed the incident; 3) where
the husband would object to the abortion for religious reasons; 4)
where the husband is seriously ill or emotionally unstable; and 5)
where the mother is a battered wife. 122 The testimony also revealed
what are known as "skewed relationships," where "the power of
the husband is so overwhelming that he will, if consulted, obstruct,
or altogether prevent, a [mother] from freely deciding to secure an
abortion."1
23
After hearing this testimony, the district court declared the stat-
ute unconstitutional and held that mandatory spousal notification
would result in an undue burden on the right of a mother to ter-
minate her pregnancy.'2 4 In reaching its decision, the court found
that the statute did not promote marital harmony and that it created
potential danger to the mother.
125
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the interests in marital
harmony and the procreative potential of the marriage which the
state advanced. 126 In addition, it noted that the state's interest "en-
compasses more than merely the husband's interest in a particular
fetus."1 27 After it acknowledged the importance of each of the state's
interests, the appellate court determined that the constitutionality of
the spousal notification statute depended on whether abortion pres-
ents more than a de minimis risk to women's procreative capabil-
ities. 12 The court reasoned that a spousal notification requirement
would be constitutional if abortion, as a medical procedure, sig-
nificantly endangers women's ability to bear children. It then re-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 540 (district court found the statute underinclusive in that it did not require noti-
fication of a hysterectomy or tubal ligation, and overinclusive in that it made no exception where
husband was not the father).
125. Id.
126. Scheinberg, 659 F.2d at 483-86.
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manded the case to the district court for determination of this issue. 29
On remand, the district court considered the risks to women's
procreative capabilities presented by abortion. 130 The court deter-
mined that abortion poses less than a de minimis risk to women's
procreative capabilities. As a result, it declared the spousal notifi-
cation statute unconstitutional.
131
As this decision illustrates, attempts to strike down statutes re-
quiring spousal notification have been successful. However, whether
states can draft statutes which do not impose too great a burden
on the mother's right to privacy is an open question. For example,
in Doe v. Deschamps,13 2 the United States District Court of Montana
held that a spousal notification requirement, 133 as written, was un-
constitutional. The statute did not specify a conclusive and uncon-
trovertible method of giving notice to the spouse so that a mother
could be certain that criminal liability for any violation of the statute
could be avoided. 134 The court reasoned that the statute did not
afford the mother nor her physician protection from criminal lia-
bility because it lacked a prescribed method of giving notice, and
there was no provision for constructive notice.
35
Two suggested solutions to faulty construction of statutes con-
taining notification provisions are for the legislature 1) to draft a
waiver provision in the statute or 2) to draft exceptions to the no-
tification requirement. 13 6 A waiver could be obtained by court order,
allowing the court to decide if the mother should notify the father
as to the pending abortion. By means of this case-by-case analysis,
a mother who had legitimate reasons for not giving the father notice
would be protected and would not be subjected to criminal penalties
for failure to notify. The Supreme Court has indicated, in Bellotti
129. Id. at 487.
130. Scheinberg, 550 F. Supp. at 1116.
131. Id.
132. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682.
133. Id. at 684 (MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-5-616(2) (1974) provided in part that an abortion was
prohibited without written notice to the woman's husband).
134. Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Comment, SpousaliVotification: An Unconstitutional Limitation On A Woman's Right To
Privacy In The Abortion Decision, 12 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 531, 555-559 (1984).
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v. Bairdj'37 that it would uphold the waiver alternative with respect
to a minor mother and parental notification. 38 Exceptions to the
notification requirement, similar to those presented by the plaintiff
in Scheinberg,139 would also protect the mother. For example, a case
involving a battered wife would be excepted from the applicability
of the statute.
C. A New Approach: "A Balancing of Constitutional Rights"
Today, fathers continue challenging the right of mothers to choose
to abort their unborn children. However, the approach taken in the
courtroom today is different from approaches previously used to
challenge abortion statutes. Instead of relying solely on the consti-
tutional rights of procreation 140 or parenthood 14' as grounds for pro-
hibiting the abortion, fathers now request that the mother's right
to privacy be balanced against the father's privacy interests. 42 They
also argue that, although Danforth prohibited an absolute veto power
on the part of the husband for any reason, the Court did not exclude
other forms of relief.143 That is, the Court left open the possibility
of considering the competing rights of the mother and the father
on a case-by-case basis. Fathers contend that the mothers' rights do
not outweigh their own rights in all instances.
For example, in In re The Unborn Child H, 4 an eighteen year-
old mother wanted to have an abortion because she wished to "look
nice in a bathing suit this summer" and did not want to share the
baby with the father. 45 The father challenged the abortion. The
circuit judge permanently restrained the mother from having the
137. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
138. Id. at 643-44 (state must provide an alternative procedure whereby the authorization for
the abortion can be obtained).
139. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
140. Skinner, 316 U.S. 535.
141. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
142. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. (Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, but
certain "zones" of privacy exist); see supra notes 17-23, 55-61 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. In re The Unborn Child H, No. 84C01-8804-JP-185, slip op. (Vigo County Cir. Ct., Indiana,
April 8, 1988).
145. Id. at 2.
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abortion 146 and distinguished the case from Danforth and Roe. The
court reasoned that Danforth involved a state statute and a marriage
relationship147 and that Roe involved state action. Neither of these
factors were present in the instant case.'4 The court held that the
rights of the father in the life of his unborn child are of consti-
tutional dimension under the fourteenth and ninth amendments as
well as the Indiana common law.149 The father's constitutional rights
were found to outweigh those of the mother "on the basis of the
facts." 50 The case is presently before the Indiana Supreme Court.
However, the mother violated the restraining order and had the
abortion. I
In Conn v. Conn,'5 2 a nineteen year-old pregnant wife filed a
petition to dissolve her marriage. At the time of filing the petition,
the woman told her husband that she would terminate the pregnancy
unless he agreed to give the child up for adoption once it was born.
The father sought to stop the abortion, urging that his case should
be decided by a "case-by-case" analysis because, at some point in
time, a father's constitutional rights outweigh interests such as those
asserted by the mother.'53 The mother attempted to justify the de-
cision by telling the father that the couple could not afford another
child. 154
The father urged that Danforth did not apply to this case but
rather, that it is applicable when the criminal statute gives an ab-
solute veto power. 55 The circuit court held that neither Roe nor
Danforth addressed the question of whether a father's interests need
be recognized and balanced against the mother's desire to have an
abortion. 56 Further, it noted that balancing is an appropriate judicial
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id. at 3.
148. In re The Unborn Child H, No. 84C01-8804-JP-185, slip op. at 3 (This case involved a
dispute between two individuals.).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1988, § A (National Desk), at 26, col. 1.
152. Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. App. 1988); aff'd 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988).
153. Telephone interview with Roger Bennett, counsel for the father in Conn (July 14, 1988).
154. Conn v. Conn, No. 73C01-8806-DR-127, slip op. at 4 (June 27, 1988).
155. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
156. Conn, No. 73C01-8806-DR-127, slip op. at 5.
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function where constitutional rights are asserted. 5 7 The mother was
preliminarily enjoined from having the abortion. 158 The court set
forth the following factors to be considered when a party requests
a permanent injunction:
a) whether the [mother] has consulted with a physician, and if so, is he in agree-
ment with [the mother's] decision to abort,
b) the likelihood of the child being born with grave mental or physical defects,
c) should [the mother] be ordered not to have an abortion whether she would
likely suffer any harm-medical, emotional, psychological, or otherwise,
d) whether the continuation of the pregnancy and childbirth will likely interfere
with [the mother's] education, employment, or employment opportunities,
e) whether an abortion will likely cause any harm to [the father], either emo-
tionally, psychologically, or otherwise,
f) whether [the mother] is sincere in her desire for an abortion, and whether [the
father] is sincere in his desire that [the mother] not terminate the pregnancy,
g) whether the [mother] will properly care for herself during the pregnancy,
h) how the expenses associated with prenatal care and delivery of the child will
be paid,
i) whether the pregnancy, followed by birth of a child, will cause financial hard-
ship on either [the father] or [the mother], or their respective families,
j) whether [the father] is capable of fathering another child, and
k) whether [the father] is likely to be capable, and willing, to rear the child upon
birth.' 9
Further, a father would be required to overcome a presumption that
the mother is entitled to an abortion by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The court held that this rebuttable presumption exists because
of the greater physical and emotional burden on the mother which
is associated with pregnancy and childbirth. 160
On review, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
injunction which prohibited the abortion. 6' In its analysis, the court
found that Roe and Danforth were dispositive and held that the
abortion decision concerned only the mother. 162 The Indiana Su-
157. Id.
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. at 6-7.
160. Id. at 6.
161. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. App. Dist. 1988).
162. Id. at 613.
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preme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. 16 Re-
cently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
164
In a recent Minnesota case, Anderson v. Anderson,16 a father
asked that a district court balance his interests in the life of his child
against those of the mother seeking an abortion. Asserting his pa-
rental rights, the father noted that the United States Supreme Court
has recognized a parent's right to be notified of a minor child's
decision to seek an abortion in order to safeguard the health and
well-being of that minor child.1 66 The father argued that surely his
interest in the very life of his child was equal, if not paramount,
to the parents' interest in the well-being of a minor child. 67
In most of the current cases, fathers have been successful in
obtaining temporary restraining orders. 68 However, pending final
determination of the rights involved, many mothers have violated
these orders and have had abortions, leaving the fathers discouraged
and unwilling to press the issue. 169 Whether a state supreme court
will ultimately balance the conflicting constitutional rights, taking
the rights of the father into account, remains to be seen.
170
D. West Virginia: An Analysis and a Prediction
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never decided
a case concerning a father's right of participation in the abortion
163. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958 (1988).
164. Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. App. Dist. 1988), aff'd, 526 N.E.2d 958 (1988), cert
denied, - U.S. - (1988).
165. Anderson v. Anderson, No. 88-21-320 (D. Minn., filed June 30, 1988).
166. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 409-10 (holding that parental notice requirement serves a significant
state interest by providing an opportunity for the parents of a minor to supply essential medical and
psychological information to a physician).
167. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 20, Anderson, No. 88-21-320.
168. E.g., Conn, No. 73C01-8806-DR-127, slip op. (Telephone interview with Roger Bennett,
counsel for the plaintiff, (July 14, 1988)); Anderson, No. 88-21-320 (Telephone interview with Rodney
Brodin, counsel for the plaintiff, (July 7, 1988)). See also In re The Unborn Child H, No. 84C01-
8804-JP-185; Moss, Fathers' Rights Sought 74 A.B.A. J. 19 (1988).
169. For example, in Buel v. Doss, a case originating in Dallas District Court, Dallas, Texas,
a father became discouraged and dropped his action after the mother violated a temporary restraining
order by having an abortion. Telephone interview with Eric Borseth, counsel for the father in Buel
(Dallas D. Ct.) (June 14, 1988).
170. Even after a father is granted a "balancing" test, he must overcome the strong language
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decision. The West Virginia Code does not require spousal consent
or spousal notification for an abortion, although it does require
parental notification where an abortion is to be performed upon an
unemancipated minor.'
7'
Predicting how the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
might resolve such an issue involves two questions. First, if the state
legislature enacted a spousal consent or spousal notification pro-
vision, would it be held unconstitutional? Secondly, even in the ab-
sence of a statute, would a father prevail on a petition for a
"balancing" of his constitutional rights with those of the mother?
An abortion statute requiring spousal rights has not been pro-
posed by West Virginia legislative committees in recent years. How-
ever, some amendments to current laws have been proposed which
would limit public assistance medical services funding 72 to those
abortions that are necessary to save the life of the mother or to
those where incest or rape has occurred. 7 Other amendments have
sought to make abortions illegal at the point of viability. 74
However, if spousal rights were codified into West Virginia's
abortion laws, requirements of notification or consent would prob-
ably be declared unconstitutional. With regard to a spousal consent
statute, Simopoulos v. Virginia,' a Virginia Supreme Court case,
is helpful to the analysis. In that case, a physician was convicted
of employing abortion procedures during the second trimester, out-
side of the hospital, in violation of a Virginia statute. 7 Although
171. W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-1 to 9 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
172. S. 175, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess., introduced January 19, 1988; H.R. 4380, 68th Leg., Reg,
Sess., introduced February 4, 1988; H.R. 2104, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess., introduced January 15, 1988.
173. See W. VA. CODE § 9-4-2 (Repl. Vol. 1984). This fund consists of payments made out of
state appropriations for medical services to recipients of specified classes of welfare assistance and
federal grants-in-aid made available for specified classes of welfare assistance.
174. See H.R. 2033, 68th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
175. Simopoulos, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194.
176. The physician violated the statute's requirement that second trimester abortion procedure
be employed in a hospital; however, the Virginia Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional
in a footnote of the opinion. The statute read as follows: "Consent required. Before performing any
abortion or inducing any miscarriage or terminating a pregnancy. . ., the physician shall obtain the
written consent of the woman. . .; [T]hen only after permission is given in writing . . . by her
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the court held that the "hospital" requirement was not an obstacle
in the path of the mother's decision to abort, it affirmed the con-
viction of the physician. More important to this discussion, the court
stated in a footnote, citing Danforth, that when imposed by the
state, spousal and parental consent requirements are unconstitu-
tional. 177 Because the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals finds
Virginia law persuasive, it might consider not only Danforth, but
might also look to this decision and declare a spousal consent statute
unconstitutional. Similarly, the court would probably declare a spou-
sal notification provision unconstitutional. Although no West Vir-
ginia cases address the notification issue, most courts have struck
down these statutes, 17 and the West Virginia Court would likely do
the same.
Even in the absence of statutorily imposed rights, would the court
grant a father's petition for a "balancing" of the constitutional
rights involved? Because of the absence of any West Virginia cases
addressing a father's rights in the abortion decision, this article an-
alyzes West Virginia cases where the Supreme Court of Appeals has
recognized parental rights. For example, in In re R.J.M. 79 a trial
court terminated parental rights because the parents refused to care
for the child. On appeal, a majority of the court affirmed the circuit
court's decision. However, more important to the discussion of a
father's rights is Justice Miller's dissent. In In re R.J.M.,1s° Justice
Miller emphasized the constitutional grounds of parenthood and ar-
gued that the proper disposition would have been a rehabilitative
program for the parents.' 8' His opinion referred to such landmark
cases as Stanley v. Illinoisls2 (right to parenthood), Skinner v.
Oklahoma'83 (right to procreate), and Griswold v. Connecticut14 (right
to privacy). His opinion stated that "[w]here the constitutionally
177. Simopoulos, 221 Va. at 1076 n.8, 27; S.E.2d at 204 n.8 (when imposed by the state, spousal
and parental consent requirements for access to hospital abortion services are unconstitutional).
178. See supra note 108.
179. In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 509-10, 266 S.E.2d at 121 (Miller, J., dissenting).
182. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
183. Skinner, 316 U.S. 535.
184. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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protected interests of parenthood are at stake, overriding consid-
erations permit impingement only to the minimum extent necessary
to achieve the particular goal." 8 5 In addition, the dissenting opinion
noted that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had held
in an earlier case that Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia
Constitution1 86 protected the fundamental right of parenthood.'8 7
Considering this analysis, the West Virginia Supreme Court may
decide in the future that the constitutional rights of procreation,
parenthood, and privacy apply to fathers and agree to balance them
against the constitutional right of privacy of mothers. The United
States Supreme Court has already declared that mothers' rights to
privacy encompass the abortion decision. However, there is no in-
dication that the West Virginia Supreme Court will balance the con-
flicting constitutional rights.
E. The Effect of the Present Make-up of the United States
Supreme Court
Currently, a mother's right to privacy encompasses her decision
whether or not to abort her unborn child, as established in Roe v.
Wade.188 The Roe case was decided by a seven to two majority. The
majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun; the other ma-
jority members included Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and
Stewart, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell concurring.
The dissenting members were Justices White and Rehnquist.'89
Today, the Court is composed of Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, White, Stevens, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy. Significantly, only three members of the Roe majority remain
on the Court. What would happen to Roe if a statute prohibiting
abortion were challenged again? Would the challenge make it to the
185. In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 510, 266 S.E.2d 114, 121-22 (Miller, J., dissenting).
186. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and
the judgment of his peers." W. VZA. CoNsT. art. III, § 10.
187. In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. at 510, 266 S.E.2d at 121 (citing In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225,
207 S.E.2d 129 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court? How would the present Court decide? Both mothers
and fathers wonder what the outcome would be, considering the
present composition of the Court.
Although only three members of the Roe majority remain, Justice
Stevens takes a comparatively liberal view of abortion rights, prob-
ably increasing the number supporting Roe to four. 190 Justice O'Con-
nor, however, indicated in her dissent in a case reaffirming Roe,
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 91 that she would
join Justices White and Rehnquist.' 92 Her vote, along with the votes
of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, would be critical. All three of the
Justices are Reagan Administration appointees. President Reagan's
support of the pro-life movement may be an indication of what view
the Justices will take. 93
Whether a challenge will make it to the present Supreme Court
remains to be seen. However, the prospect appears likely. For ex-
ample, on April 25, 1988, the Arizona legislature rejected by one
vote a bill that would have outlawed abortions in Arizona.194 Sim-
ilarly, the next challenge may be made by a father seeking to assert
his rights. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari to such a case, it
may overrule Roe, or it may simply limit the privacy right given to
the mother in Roe by subjecting that right to the balancing test that
fathers seek today. If the mother's privacy right is ultimately limited,
a father will have either a right to consent and/or a right to be
notified, or be entitled to a balancing of his rights with those of
the mother.
IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional challenges to abortion statutes that require spousal
consent and/or spousal notification have been common. 195 In the
190. Reidinger, Will Roe v. Wade Be Overruled?, 74 A.B.A. J. 66, 68 (1988).
191. Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
192. Reidinger, supra note 190 at 68. Justice O'Connor called Roe's mechanism for weighing
the competing rights of the mother and state "completely unworkable". She stated that the decision
was "clearly on a collision course with itself" (referring that medical technology may advance so that
fetal viability is possible in the first trimester of pregnancy).
193. Id. at 70 (discussion of Reagan administration; solicitor general directly asked Supreme
Court to overrule Roe v. Wade).
194. Id.




Walters: Who Decides--The Next Abortion Issue: A Discussion of Fathers' Ri
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
past, state courts and lower federal courts have declared these sta-
tutes unconstitutional on the basis that Roe v. Wade'96 established
that a woman's right to privacy encompasses her decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy. 197 In addition, the courts have
relied upon Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth98
to invalidate consent provisions that give the spouse an absolute veto
power in the abortion decision. 199 Finally, the courts, in accord with
Roe and Danforth, have refused to address what rights, if any, the
father has in the abortion decision. 200
Today, however, the courts are beginning to acknowledge that
fathers' contentions may be valid. Fathers are asking for a "bal-
ancing" of their constitutional rights against those of the mother. 20'
They argue that the Supreme Court, in striking down an absolute
veto power in Danforth, left open the possibility of determining case-
by-case whether a father's rights outweigh the mother's, 202 and that
a hearing should be granted to balance the rights involved. The lower
courts have distinguished Roe as involving state action and Danforth
as involving the constitutionality of an absolute veto power. 203 From
their analysis of the facts and the constitutional rights involved, these
lower courts have held that the father's rights outweigh those of the
mother in cases before them and have issued restraining orders, pro-
hibiting the mother from having an abortion. 204
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never ad-
dressed the issue of whether a father has rights in the abortion de-
cision. However, the court would likely follow the majority of courts
that have addressed the issue and declare any statutorily imposed
spousal consent or notification provision unconstitutional. 205 Whether
196. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
197. See supra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
198. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52.
199. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 100, 108 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 140-67 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
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the court would recognize a "balancing" of the constitutional rights
of the mother and father is questionable.
20 6
Another factor impacting upon decisions regarding the father's
rights is the present makeup of the United States Supreme Court.
The new justices on the Court will play significant roles, as only
three members of the Roe majority remain. Two of the Justices,
Scalia and Kennedy, have yet to participate in an abortion case.20 7
Should the Court overrule or limit Roe v. Wade 20 the mother's
right to decide whether to abort may be subject to a balancing against
the constitutional rights of the father.
Fifteen years ago, the United States Supreme Court refused to
discuss the father's rights in the abortion decision. In doing so, the
Court created its own destiny. Fathers will continue to raise con-
stitutional challenges to a woman's unilateral right to terminate her
pregnancy. Although the lower courts have wrestled with these issues
for some time, the Supreme Court must eventually decide what the
father's rights are in the abortion decision.
Maria F. Walters
206. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
208. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
1988]
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